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Two of a Kind:  
Are norms of honor a species of morality? 
Toby Handfield (Monash University) 
John Thrasher (Chapman University) 
 
Abstract: Should the norms of honor cultures be classified as a variety of 
morality? In this paper, we address this question by considering various 
empirical bases on which norms can be taxonomically organised. This 
question is of interest both as an exercise in philosophy of social science, and 
for its potential implications in meta-ethical debates. Using recent data from 
anthropology and evolutionary game theory, we argue that the most 
productive classification emphasizes the strategic role that moral norms play 
in generating assurance and stabilizing cooperation. Because honor norms 
have a similar functional role, this account entails honor norms are indeed a 
variety of moral norm. We also propose an explanation of why honor norms 
occur in a relatively unified, phenotypically distinctive cluster, thereby 
explaining why it is tempting to regard them as taxonomically distinct. 
 
Sometimes honor demands virtue. An “honor code” requires individuals to abstain 
from opportunities to cheat, in line with widely shared moral ideas. In many cultures, 
to be honorable requires generous hospitality, abstinence from theft, and a firm 
commitment to honesty: all typical moral virtues. But often, norms of honor and 
norms of morality appear to be in conflict. The early modern European duel 
encouraged men to engage in lethal violence, sometimes over trivial or contrived 
slights (Allen and Reed 2006). In cultures that practice “honor killings”, victims of 
rape are sometimes murdered in order to repair family reputation (Chesler 2010). In 
cultures that practice blood feuds, the retaliatory cycle can lead to dozens of deaths 
over a period of decades (Boehm 1986). Not only are these seemingly immoral acts 
occasionally tolerated, they are positively required by the social norms of the honor 
society. Those who do not follow the relevant norms of honor suffer consequent social 
disadvantage, ranging from outright punishment to shunning and ostracism.  
 
We look at characteristic features of honor norms across different societies and 
different times to determine whether there is a principled way of distinguishing these 
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norms from morality. This question is of interest because of the general 
methodological issue it raises for social science: what constitutes evidence that a set of 
norms should be considered a distinct cluster or kind?  
 
We argue attempts to demarcate honor and morality based on their psychological 
features, such as their first-order content or their motivational profile, are unlikely to 
succeed. Paradigmatic examples of honor psychology and moral psychology are each 
too heterogeneous to permit very strong generalisations, and they have a good deal of 
overlap. We further argue that honor and morality have some important functional 
similarities, which suggests they are better regarded as alternative solutions to a 
common set of core social problems. Specifically, both honor and moral norms 
contribute to sustaining cooperation by overcoming assurance problems and 
stabilizing cooperation. Assurance problems arise in strategic interactions where the 
more beneficial behaviour (individually, collectively, or both) makes the actor 
vulnerable to the choice of the other party. Different environments—both physical 
and social—will emphasise different types of assurance problem, generating demand 
for different mechanisms to solve those problems. We argue this explains why honor 
cultures tend to be associated with particular sorts of ecological and political 
environments. 
 
We interpret these findings in light of recent attempts by evolutionary psychologists 
to map the domain of morality and argue that these give some support for the idea 
that honor is indeed a species of morality, though the same evidence suggests morality 
should be construed very broadly. Specifically, the descriptive extension of “morality” 
covers a set of norms that are considerably more diverse than most accounts of moral 
normativity are willing to allow. In the conclusion, we discuss some implications of 
this view. In particular, our conclusion suggests that if we also accept moral realism, 
the moral landscape will be characterized by a plurality of conflicting norms. Tragic 
conflict is therefore likely to be an inevitable feature of the moral realm. A second 
implication relates to how we should go about studying moral and social norms from 
a naturalistic point of view. Categories derived from traditional moral theory and 
metaethics are, we argue, ill-suited to the scientific study of human norms.  
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1 What are Norms of Honor? 
Members of honor cultures are, by and large, highly concerned to defend a certain 
sort of social status: that of being “honorable”.1 The exact meaning of honorable status 
varies across cultures, but themes related to honesty, bravery, and female chastity 
recur frequently. This social status, and the concern to preserve it, undergird a set of 
social practices and norms which help to constitute the meaning of honor, while also 
prescribing the appropriate actions to defend, maintain, or threaten someone’s honor. 
So understood, probably all cultures have some concern for honor. For present 
purposes, we wish to isolate particularly extreme examples of devotion to honor. 
Accordingly, we define a culture of honor to be one where widely accepted social 
norms sometimes demand violent behaviour to defend honorable status.2 Feuding 
Balkan herders (Boehm 1986), Californian prison gangs (Skarbek 2014), duelling 
European aristocrats (Allen and Reed 2006), South Asian practitioners of honor 
killing (Chesler and Bloom 2012), and the Scots-Irish settlers of the American south 
(Nisbett and Cohen 1996; Grosjean 2014) are all members of honor cultures in this 
sense.  
 
Within honor cultures, we see two main types of norm that require violence: norms of 
revenge and norms of purification. Revenge norms require individuals to avenge 
                                                      
1 Note that we use the terms “norms of honor”, “honor codes”, and “honor norms” interchangeably. 
Similarly, we make no distinction between “morality” and “moral norms” for present purposes. 
2 Leung and Cohen (2011) distinguish three types of culture: honor, dignity, and face. The culture of 
face is, like an honor culture, highly concerned about socially conferred status, and many socially 
important behaviors are motivated primarily by emotions of pride and shame, rather than by 
conscience and guilt. Here we effectively treat the concerns of face cultures as a species of honor norms, 
and do not attempt the analytic task of distinguishing the primary norms of the two. That said, Leung 
and Cohen suggest a key difference between honor and face cultures is that the social hierarchy is 
steeper, more pronounced, and relatively stable in a face culture, whereas honor cultures are relatively 
egalitarian. When we restrict our focus to cultures that defend honor with violence, we appear to have 
converged on a very similar understanding as Leung and Cohen, because the use of violence is likely a 
symptom of an unstable status hierarchy. 
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slights, insults and other wrongdoing against one’s self or extended family by harming 
outgroup members. Norms of purification prescribe expulsion or violence towards in-
group members who bring dishonor to one’s group. In both cases, failure to comply 
with these norms will lead to feelings of shame for the transgressor, attitudes of 
contempt from others, and consequent social disadvantage for the transgressor.  
 
Having characterized some of the central features common to honor cultures, it is also 
important to stress their heterogeneity. Some cultures of honor revolve primarily 
around revenge norms, others around purity norms, and yet others have both.3 
Cultures of honor are sometimes informal, such as the Pashtunwali (Ginsburg 2011) 
or the culture of Montenegrin herders (Boehm 1986), but sometimes they are 
formalized, as in codes of duelling (Allen and Reed 2006; LaVaque-Manty 2006) and 
bushido, the samurai warrior code (French 2004, chap. 8). We will use the term 
“honor code”—for convenient contrast with the notion of a moral code—to refer to 
the norms characteristic of an honor culture, in an attempt to generalize over this 
significant heterogeneity. 
 
Honorable status is partly constituted by compliance with the local norms of purity 
and revenge. It is also characterised in part by the distinctive emotions and reactions 
to the loss of that status. Losing honor is stereotypically associated with shame, rather 
than with guilt, fear, anger, sadness, or other negative emotions. That said, shame is 
not uniquely associated with transgressions of honor norms: cross-cultural evidence 
suggests shame is a robust reaction to local disapproval (Sznycer et al. 2018). But it is 
striking that honor is regained by a defiant act – an act of revenge or of purification – 
rather than by apology, reparation, or otherwise conciliatory behaviour. Indeed, 
honor cultures are sometimes characterised by uniting positive and negative 
reciprocity: avenging wrongs done is seen as evidence one will return favours also, 
and vice versa (Leung and Cohen 2011). Avenging an insult or slight is not just a way 
of demonstrating that one should not be predated against, but also a way of 
                                                      
3 For a wide-ranging discussion of the variety of different honor cultures and codes, see Tamler 
Sommers Why Honor Matters (2018). 
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maintaining a reputation as a person who can be trusted to honor debts and promises. 
This shame–defiance pattern distinguishes honor’s reactive footprint from alternative 
patterns of response such as guilt-then-apology or 
embarrassment/downplaying/concealment which might ensue from other types of 
normative transgression. 
 
2 Defining Morality 
A definition of morality can be either normative or descriptive. A normative 
definition, may make use of normative language in its formulation. So, for instance, if 
we define morality as that set of codes which rational individuals should regard as 
overriding, we have adopted a normative definition. If we instead define it as a code of 
behavior which (some subset of) individuals do regard as overriding, then we have a 
descriptive definition. For our purposes, we need a definition which will allow it to be, 
in principle, empirically tractable whether or not a given phenotype is “moral”, and 
also allow it to be a non-trivial question whether or not honor norms are examples of 
morality: it should not be settled a priori by the definition. We therefore employ a 
descriptive definition.4  
 
In this section, we consider three approaches to defining morality with these 
desiderata in mind. First, we consider the possibility that moral norms have a 
distinctive motivational force. Second, we consider the possibility that moral norms 
have a distinctive type of content. Finally, we consider the possibility that moral 
norms can be understood in terms of a social evolutionary framework, as a set of 
social technologies adapted to address a certain class of strategic problems. Only the 
third of these approaches is fruitful, we argue. 
 
                                                      
4 The relationship between “morality”, descriptively defined, and “morality”, normatively understood, 
takes us into fraught meta-ethical debates which we dare not enter at present. Suffice to say we think 
there is some relation between the two, and this is part of why we think the present project has interest 
for debates about moral realism. But for all we say here, it is possible the descriptive definition is 
entirely irrelevant to the normative understanding. 
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Terminologically, the following discussion is complicated by our intending the reader 
to have in mind certain candidate “moral” norms and “honor” norms so as to evaluate 
the implications of the candidate proposals, while those very proposals might – if 
adopted – significantly erode or even collapse the distinction between the two classes. 
We have tried to avoid an abundance of scare quotes to make the text more readable, 
but this does come at some cost of ambiguity. 
 
2.1 Can morality be defined by the motivational force of moral norms? 
One allegedly distinctive feature of moral norms that has attracted considerable 
attention from philosophers is their motivational force. This broad idea is variously 
expressed by saying moral norms are overriding, categorical, or authoritative. 
Individuals who are moved by a moral commitment appear willing to forego 
substantial personal benefits, and even to incur painful and burdensome costs, in 
order (i) to fulfil their moral obligations, (ii) to punish those who transgress moral 
obligations, and/or (iii) to advocate their moral beliefs. 
 
Relatedly, in social psychology, moral norms are distinguished from non-moral, 
conventional norms by their unconditional form (Nucci and Turiel 1978; Turiel 
1983). In this vein, Cristina Bicchieri argues moral norms are “unconditional” 
(Bicchieri 2006).5 According to Bicchieri, what makes norms conditional or not is how 
sensitive one’s compliance and endorsement are to expectations that others will 
                                                      
5 See also (Brennan et al. 2013; O’Neill 2018, sec. 3). Nic Southwood (2011) uses the terms “practice-
dependent” and “practice-independent” in a somewhat more subtle way – distinguishing them from 
conditionality/unconditionality by referring to what grounds the normative judgment that such-and-
such should be done. According to Southwood, a normative judgment is practice-dependent just in 
case it appears to the judging agent that a social practice plays a non-derivative role in justifying acting 
in accordance with a corresponding principle (p. 778). While this strategy has some evident attractions 
for distinguishing the moral from the conventional in comparison with alternative proposals, for our 
purposes we can treat it along with other proposals relating to the motivational force of norms. We also 
register some concern that this criterion is both highly individualistic and introspective: it turns on how 
the justification of a norm appears to a given individual. We suspect for purposes of explaining social 
phenomena, a concept like this unlikely to be particularly fruitful on this point, see (Gaus 2014). 
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comply with and endorse the norm. If we behave in Rome as the Romans do, we are 
directed by conditional norms. If, however, when confronted with those who disagree 
with our norms, we respond with “here I stand, I can do no other,” we are following 
an unconditional norm.6 
 
This suggests the hypothesis that honor norms are conditional while moral norms are 
unconditional. If this hypothesis were true, it would enable us to make sense of the 
apparent conflict between honor and morality, and why this conflict can persist in a 
society. The norms can have different first order content: they require incompatible 
behaviours, but they have different psychological and sociological foundations: the 
psychology of conditional versus unconditional norms. 
 
This hypothesis has several shortcomings. First, there may be no straightforward way 
to classify an entire community’s norm as conditional or unconditional, as this 
hypothesis presupposes. For instance, in Indian society, Hindu children are trained 
from a very young age not to use one’s left hand for eating. For many, this norm will 
be adopted conditionally. A Hindu migrant may lose any compunction about using 
his or her left hand in eating once they move to Hong Kong, for instance. However, 
we can also imagine this individual still refusing to use his or her left hand while 
eating, even though the context has shifted and there is no danger of anyone socially 
sanctioning this person for non-compliance. In this case the norm appears 
unconditional. Given this individual level heterogeneity, it is hard to identify a non-
arbitrary way of classifying an entire community’s norm as conditional or 
unconditional.  
 
Second, even if we grant that norms can be suitably categorised, there is limited 
evidence for the unconditional character of stereotypically moral norms.7 The classic 
distinction between the moral and conventional has become increasingly unstable in 
the face of new experimental evidence (Kelly et al. 2007; Fraser 2012; Quintelier, 
                                                      
6 Bicchieri (2006) discusses two categories of non-conditional norms: personal norms and moral 
norms. Personal norms, for instance how one takes their tea, do not concern us here. 
7 See (O’Neill 2018) for a recent review.  
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Fessler, and Smet 2012; Quintelier and Fessler 2015). The situationist attack on stable 
character traits undermines the notion that moral norms are viewed as unconditional 
(Harman 1999; Doris 2005). Social psychology (Milgram 1974) and experimental 
economics (McCabe, Rigdon, and Smith 2003; Smith 2008; Abbink et al. 2017) have 
also shown in numerous ways that moral norms are followed and dropped for 
surprising reasons in different contexts.  
 
Third, there is evidence that honor norms are sometimes treated as unconditional: 
individuals are motivated to act on perceived obligations of honor, at odds with all 
other considerations. Honor killings in western democratic nations provide a stark 
example: a father who kills his “too westernized” daughter in suburban Arizona, for 
instance, does not earn any admiration from neighbours, does not improve his 
family’s social standing, and will almost certainly be incarcerated for a lengthy period 
(Gaynor 2011). Anthony Appiah (2011) raises the case of the Duke of Wellington who 
engaged in a duel, despite clearly understanding it was a substantial risk to his life 
(given his poor marksmanship), it jeopardized the political causes that he valued, and 
it was contrary to the teaching of his church – of which he was a devout member. 
Wellington seems to have acted as if the norms of honor to which he subscribed were 
unconditional. In literature, characters like John Proctor in The Crucible and the 
titular character of Lord Jim are willing to die rather than violate norms of honor. 
Proctor in particular illustrates the apparent power of honor to outrank a competing 
demand that might be thought “moral”: he is willing to tell a blatant lie, guaranteeing 
his damnation (given circumstances in which it will save his life and that of others), 
but cannot bring himself to publish the lie, and thus dishonor his name.  
 
Beyond these anecdotal examples, further evidence that honor norms promote 
unconditional compliance comes from an experiment in which members of honor 
cultures were primed so as to make salient normative ideals of retaliation and revenge 
(Leung and Cohen 2011). After priming, those who approved of retaliatory violence 
were more likely to behave honestly in a task where there was an opportunity to cheat 
for material gain. In contrast, members of honor cultures who disapproved of 
retaliatory violence (and hence were reacting against their culture’s primary 
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normative logic) were more likely to cheat after exposure to the same prime. Given 
there was no evident opportunity for honest behaviour in the first group to be socially 
recognised, it is difficult to explain the marginal effect except in terms of an 
unconditional norm. 
 
It is possible, however, that even though honor norms are viewed as unconditional, 
they only generate unconditional demands for members of the honor society, i.e., the 
norms are not used to evaluate the conduct of outsiders, and so are not universal. This 
suggests another possible distinction: moral norms may be universal, while honor 
norms are not. 
 
Many moral theories, however, eschew universalism. Explicitly relativist theories of 
morality are non-universal (Harman 1975, 2015), but so are plausible versions of 
constructivism (Street 2010) and contractarianism (Gauthier 1986; Moehler 2018), as 
well as conventionalist theories (Vanderschraaf 2018). These are all normative 
theories of morality of course, but we suggest the case for abandoning universalism 
becomes all the stronger if one adopts a descriptive approach, as we do. (Though see 
§3 where we discuss a reason why this distinction may prove to be symptomatic of a 
more fundamental underlying difference between honor and morality.)  
 
None of the foregoing arguments are decisive, but given how thin the evidence is for 
each of the proposals surveyed, it appears unmotivated to place a great deal of weight 
on allegedly distinctive motivational features of different types of norms. It remains 
an important and interesting open question: what is the psychology of an 
unconditional norm for? Why did humans evolve the ability to internalise a norm and 
treat it as an objective demand?8 If this question can be answered, it might guide us to 
better understand why some types of norm are more or less likely to be held 
unconditionally. But without such guidance, and the very mixed empirical evidence, 
there appears little basis for distinguishing our paradigms of honor norms and moral 
norms in these terms. 
                                                      
8 On this point see: (Joyce 2006; Gavrilets and Richerson 2017; Stanford 2018). 
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2.2 Do moral norms have distinctive first-order content? 
Rejecting the hypothesis that the norms of morality and honor have fundamentally 
different modes of motivating behavior, we might instead think the contents of honor 
and moral norms systematically conflict. Typical moral norms might be: “Avoid 
harming innocents”, “Apologize and be remorseful for your own transgressions”, 
“Don’t take unfair advantage of others”, and so on.9 These are obviously rather 
different from norms of revenge and purification. Second, honor codes tend to 
require violent or conflictual behaviour, often as a response to conflict or transgression 
(Sommers 2009) whereas it might (perhaps naively) be thought that moral codes 
typically involve a number of requirements to prevent or diminish conflict.10  
 
This touches on a third possible point of difference: moral motivation is frequently 
theorized as a variety of motivation that is not solely directed towards personal benefit. 
Someone whose motive is solely self-interested, either through pursuit of future 
reciprocal benefit, or through enhanced reputation, is regarded as a poor moral 
exemplar.11 But a person motivated by honor can—at least in many cases—be 
                                                      
9 Of course, there are norms for which there seems a good case to categorise them either as a norm of 
honor or as a moral norm. Keeping promises for instance, may sound like a moral norm, but what 
about swearing an oath, which is usually construed as a matter of honor? Any attempt to distinguish 
honor and morality on the basis of content would need to adjudicate such cases, but because we think 
this approach ultimately unsatisfactory, we will leave the matter unresolved. See Scanlon (1998, 323–
26) for an attempt to make good the distinction between promises, which are entered into freely, and 
oaths made on the basis of honor. Although both are related to assurance in some way, Scanlon argues 
that the first create specifically moral obligations, while the second are related to aretaic values, but not 
distinctly moral obligations.  
10 There is good reason to think violence is frequently “moralistic” in the sense that it is committed to 
achieve what is seen as a moral goal (Black 1983). Alan Fiske and Tage Rai (2014) argue moral 
motivation is actually essential to the vast majority of violent behaviour. Nonetheless, we suppress these 
concerns at present for the sake of testing the hypothesis that morality and honor can be distinguished 
along these lines. 
11 There are any number of examples of this in the history of moral philosophy. Kant (1785) argues in 
the first lines of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals that nothing can be called “good” without 
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transparently engaged in the cultivation of an enhanced social image without the loss 
of honor. A duellist, for instance, need have no compunction about engaging in the 
duel for the purposes of preserving his social status, i.e. for purely personal benefit. In 
contrast, if someone confessed that they acted morally only out of an expectation of 
praise or esteem, this would undermine our moral assessment of them.  
 
To distinguish honor and morality on the basis that moral motivation can never be 
solely self-interested, while honourable motivation can be, makes for an empirically 
feeble dichotomy. One type is defined by a universal negative property, while the 
other is a mere compatibility with the corresponding positive property. Hence in any 
given case where self-interest is absent, it remains unresolved which kind is being 
dealt with. More fruitful proposals might suggest that honour-compliance is always 
motivated by self-interest, or that moral behaviour is always motivated by a positive 
concern for the collective good. 
 
None of these proposals fit comfortably with examples of honor codes motivating 
honest behaviour, the forswearing of personal gain, and willingness to accept 
significant costs, as discussed above. More fundamentally, however, in all these cases, 
we cannot identify a methodological principle that explains why any differences of 
this sort are significant enough to warrant regarding honor and morality as 
constituting distinct kinds. For any set of norms, it will be possible to gerrymander 
two sets that differ in content. Insisting on these sorts of differences as definitive of 
the kinds conflicts with our requirement not to beg the question against those who 
think it at least an open possibility that honor is a species of morality. What is 
required is a substantive reason for why a given distinction in content warrants 
treating the classes as distinct. 
 
                                                      
qualification except the “good will,” which is aimed at the moral law, not personal benefit. More 
generally, Kurt Baier (1954, 104–5) argues that to act from the “moral point of view” is to act on the 
basis of principle or distinctively moral reasons. Whatever “moral” principles and reasons are, they are 
not merely prudential. Even if prudence is the ultimate foundation and justification of morality (e.g., 
Gauthier 1986; Moehler 2018), the moral norms are not identical with prudential norms.  
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In recent ethnographic work, Benjamin Purzycki and colleagues (2018) have 
attempted to give a detailed, empirical account of morality, by comparing the moral 
“models” of eight diverse cultures using a very simple open-ended question: “What 
makes a good/bad person?” This methodology is motivated by a number of concerns, 
such as the absence of “morality” and “moral” in some languages, whereas “good/bad” 
appear to be cultural universals. They find generosity and honesty are the most salient 
“good”-making features, while deceit, theft, and violence were the most salient “bad”-
making features. This leads to their conclusion that “[c]ross-culturally, the most 
salient components of individuals’ mental models of morality revolve around the 
provisioning of material resources in the form of generosity, helpfulness, and theft” 
(Purzycki et al. 2018, 8, 4.2.1). 
 
Although these findings are of significant intrinsic interest, they are not sufficient to 
deliver a categorisation of norms that adjudicates our question. First, these data are 
not enough to draw any sharp boundary around the moral domain as a whole, since 
the sample of just eight cultures is still only a very small portion of global variation. 
Second, since the method used here does not distinguish between the specifically 
“moral” and the “good” or “appropriate”, the results are compatible with thinking 
either that honor and moral norms are part of a larger moral domain or that they are 
distinct. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that some of the most salient traits appear to 
track concerns that are associated with honor in many cultures: e.g. honesty, 
deceitfulness, hospitality, respectfulness, and arrogance. 
 
A second cross-cultural study of relevance is Emma Buchtel and her collaborators’ 
(2015) study of Chinese and Western cultures. Buchtel asks what behaviours are 
immoral, and finds there is significant variation between Chinese and Western 
subjects. In particular, “mainland Chinese were more likely to describe uncivilized 
behaviours as ‘immoral’ compared with harmful behaviours, whereas Westerners did 
the opposite” (Buchtel et al. 2015, 1389). For the Chinese subjects, incivility rather 
than harm seems to be the basis of judging many behaviours to be morally wrong. 
Aside from further challenging the strict moral/convention distinction, these results 
are striking in that they find the “Chinese lay concept of ‘immorality’… is more 
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applicable to spitting on the street than killing people” (Buchtel et al. 2015, 1392). This 
suggests significant diversity must be tolerated in any account of the moral domain. 
And again, several of the behaviours identified as “immoral” by Chinese subjects were 
potentially examples of honor-norm violations: being unfilial, selling out/betraying 
others, adultery, back-stabbing, and lying.  
 
Reflecting on studies like these reinforces that raw ethnographic data are inevitably 
doomed to underdetermine the sort of theoretical distinction we are seeking. While 
we may wish for a more empirically grounded conception of morality, theoretical 
commitments cannot be avoided outright. We suggest an evolutionary framework 
provides the necessary overarching constraints for any proposals to identify a class of 
norms as worthy of distinct study. Gene-culture co-evolution by natural selection and 
social transmission provides a well-confirmed theoretical basis for understanding the 
social world which unifies the social and physical sciences, a basis which has had 
increasing success at predicting and explaining a range of cultural phenomena such as 
culinary practices, religious doctrine, and ethnic markers (e.g. Robert Boyd and 
Richerson 1988; Henrich and Henrich 2007; Henrich 2009; Bowles and Gintis 2011; 
Gintis and Fehr 2012).  
 
2.3 An Evolutionary framework for categorising norms 
Drawing on the failure to find robust conceptual analyses of morality, on cross-
cultural variance in “moral” intuitions, and on the failure of various attempts to 
identify the moral domain either with certain distinctive content or distinctive force, 
Stephen Stich (2017) argues there is no moral domain: the kind is too heterogeneous 
to be the subject of well-constituted scientific debate. While sharing Stich’s pessimism 
about approaches based on psychological content, we believe there is significant 
potential for a functional account of norms more generally, based on their role in the 
evolution of human sociality. Equipped with such a framework, we will be better able 
to assess the differences and similarities between different classes of norms, such as 
the stereotypically moral and stereotypically honor-based. 
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Given many norm-governed behaviours appear to serve a group-beneficial function at 
a cost of individual fitness, they prima facie require special explanation in an 
evolutionary framework. The following are the best-established elements of the 
current orthodoxy. First, many “moral” behaviours are altruistic in the sense that they 
sacrifice the wellbeing of the actor for the wellbeing of another, but need not be fitness-
sacrificing in the sense of reducing the number of the actor’s surviving offspring. That 
is: what is psychologically “sacrificial” or altruistic need not be biologically sacrificial 
(Kitcher 2011, 18–20). Second, the concept of inclusive fitness can be used to show 
how helping those in a group to which one is closely related can increase the 
reproductive success of one’s genes, even if it involves a lower rate of reproduction by 
the individual (Hamilton 1964a, 1964b). Third, many “moral” behaviours involve a 
mutually beneficial exchange of favours—these behaviours need involve no sacrifice 
of fitness or wellbeing, but merely require an environment in which there are 
mechanisms to maintain trust and to reduce associated risks (Trivers 1971). 
 
These mechanisms that explain how various aspects of our norm-psychology can be 
compatible with Darwinian evolutionary processes require that behaviour be 
motivated in particular ways, that it be targeted to particular individuals, and that it be 
regulated by certain contextual features. Broadly speaking, these are all strategic 
considerations. From this perspective, morality can be fruitfully regarded as a sort of 
social technology to implement the necessary strategic checks and measures for 
altruism, reciprocity, and related behaviours to be fitness-enhancing (Gaus 2015). 
Norms relating to fairness are important in building trust and reducing the risk of 
defection in cases of reciprocal exchange (McCabe, Rigdon, and Smith 2003; Henrich 
2004; M. A. Nowak and Sigmund 2005). Norms relating to disgust and purity may be 
important in building group identity and directing altruistic concern towards 
associates who are more closely related (Haidt, Koller, and Dias 1993; Nichols 2002; 
Kelly 2011). Norms relating to harming other in-group members are important in 
reducing conflict and injury.12 
                                                      
12 Obviously, norms can be stupid, inefficient, and fail to serve any useful purpose—our claims about 
the functions of these norms should not be taken to imply that we neglect that possibility. On “bad 
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Norms are not the only important aspect of morality as a social technology. Emotions 
such as guilt and anger are important in proximate motivation of post-transgression 
behaviours which are necessary to rehabilitate the transgressor to a trusted status or to 
minimize the danger they will pose in future. Although we doubt morality always and 
uniquely involves unconditional norms, to the extent that this phenomenon exists, it 
may serve to bolster the motivation to comply with cooperative norms even in cases of 
high temptation (Joyce 2001). The social transmissibility of normative attitudes is 
important in preserving a social order over generations, enabling multi-generational 
cooperation in long-term projects such as maintaining a fortress, building a religious 
monument, or cultivating land, and capable of effectively competing with other 
groups (Gintis 2003; Robert Boyd and Richerson 1988; Bowles and Gintis 2011; Birch 
2017; Rozin 1991). 
 
Thinking in terms of morality as a social technology also invites the use of game 
theory to analyse the strategic circumstances that “morality” is best suited to address. 
It is no coincidence that the prisoner’s dilemma is the most discussed game in 
academic literature: its central feature is the conflict between individual self-interest 
and collective benefit (Gauthier 1986). The rational pursuit of what is best for each 
individual leads to a worse outcome for all. Conversely, achieving a better outcome for 
all requires sacrifice on the part of one or more individuals. Norms appear to play a 
significant role in motivating cooperative behaviour in circumstances analogous to 
the prisoner’s dilemma (Vanberg and Congleton 1992; Bendor and Swistak 1997; 
Bicchieri 2006). In addition to this, social structures that increase the likelihood of 
repeat interactions, the tracking of reputations, and the punishing of transgressors, 
transform the prisoner’s dilemma into related games, where fitness promoting 
behaviour for individual and group are better aligned (Skyrms 2004; Sterelny and 
Fraser 2016, 45). 
 
                                                      
norms” see (Brennan et al. 2013, chap. 8; Abbink et al. 2017; Thrasher 2018). But at the same time, 
many norms clearly do serve functions that may be of individual and social benefit. 
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We propose to adopt the Morality as Cooperation (MAC) framework, developed by 
Oliver Scott Curry and collaborators (Curry, Mullins, and Whitehouse 2018; Curry, 
Chesters, and Lissa 2018), as a basis for systematising the space of norms.13 Morality as 
Cooperation posits seven domains of moral thinking:  
 
1. family values 





7. property rights 
 
The MAC domains correspond to lessons from evolutionary game theory. Each 
domain of moral thinking relates to a distinct configuration of strategic interests that 
poses challenges to cooperation. The sorts of solution called for in each case are 
sufficiently different that it is plausible to think different social and cognitive 
mechanisms have developed to address each one. For instance, the domain of “family 
values” are the values explained by mechanisms of kin selection; heroism and 
deference are associated with the two possible strategies in pure strategy equilibria of a 
hawk–dove interaction, whereas property rights correspond to a correlated 
                                                      
13 The principal competitor to MAC at time of writing is Moral Foundations Theory (MFT), developed 
by Jonathan Haidt and Jesse Graham (Graham et al. 2011, 2013). Compared to MFT, MAC has a 
clearer rationale for what it would take to identify a new domain of moral thinking. Although the 
general theory motivating MFT is evolutionary, in practice its proponents have relied heavily on factor 
analysis of survey responses to questions like “Is the following factor relevant to whether or not a given 
behaviour is moral” to identify moral domains, but such a process is highly sensitive to the inventory of 
questionnaire items used. MAC uses a similar methodology, but is more explicit and consistent in its 
evolutionary criterion guiding the development of the questionnaire items. More work needs to be 
done showing the links between the empirical data in MFT and the underlying theory, and there are 
questions about the replicability and robustness of MFT cross culturally (Curry, Chesters, and Lissa 
2018; Purzycki et al. 2018). For these reasons, MAC is a better basis for our inquiry, though it too is 
almost certainly not the final word on these matters. In recent work using US populations, Taylor Davis 
(2018) has found further evidence that folk use of the term “moral” is inconsistent with understanding 
morality in terms of distinctive content or force of norms, and is consistent with the more pluralistic 
domains of morality associated with either MAC or MFT. 
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equilibrium of the same encounter; and so on for each domain. In this way, there is a 
theoretical criterion for when we should be open to the possibility of a new domain: 
whether or not the strategic situation is different in the problems to which it gives rise. 
 
We propose to use MAC as a framework for the question whether honor is part of 
morality. The key question, therefore, is not merely whether there is some sort of 
connotative association between the domains, as labelled in MAC, and notions of 
honor. Rather, we need to understand what social problems, if any, norms of honor 
are equipped to solve. If honor norms play a functional role, what is the strategic 
situation in which they arise? Can they be characterised as broadly “cooperative”, and 
are they substantially different from the other types of cooperation that are relevant to 
morality? 
 
3 The Functions of Honor Norms 
There is no consensus on the role of honor in strategic settings, but one common 
thought is that honor has a place in competitive settings, where agents vie for a 
resource that cannot be shared and the ensuing competition leads to costly losses for 
both parties. The classic game to model such interactions is known variously as 
Chicken, Hawk–Dove, or Snowdrift (Maynard Smith and Price 1973; Maynard Smith 
1982).  
 
It has been suggested that honor cultures dominated by norms of revenge arise in 
settings where important economic assets are easy to steal, but exogenous and formal 
enforcement is absent or weak, and thus the best mechanism to defend one’s personal 
property is “self-help” (Black 1983; Nisbett and Cohen 1996; Brown and Osterman 
2012). This sort of setting can be modelled by a sequential version of Hawk–Dove 
(Figure 2). The standard Nash solution concept predicts that Player 1 will aggress, and 
it will then be rational for Player 2 to defer. But if Player 2 can convincingly commit to 
meet any future aggression with retaliation, then it becomes rational for Player 1 to 
defer. 
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It has been suggested that the emotional responses we have to transgressions—anger, 
outrage and the like—are commitment devices to enable us, in the position of Player 
2, to credibly threaten that we will undertake irrationally costly revenge against an 
initial transgression (Frank 1988). That is, by being captive to his or her emotions, 
Player 2 cultivates a reputation as being the sort of agent who will always respond to 
aggression with similar aggression, even though this will deliver a lesser payoff in the 
short term. Convincing a potential aggressor of this disposition, however, should 
effectively deter aggressors, and will justify what may otherwise appear an irrational 
tendency to violence. Honor norms requiring revenge may play a similar role: they 
demand from individuals revenge against slights that appear to outsiders to be 
disproportionate and dangerous—but they may serve a useful function for the agents 
of revenge if they enable them to cultivate a sufficiently fearsome reputation that they 
thereby deter future attacks (Nisbett and Cohen 1996). 
 
 
Figure 2. Sequential hawk-dove game. Assuming 2c > v, the only equilibrium is (Aggress, Submit). 
We conjecture that revenge norms are particularly important in settings where there 
are collectives that wish to protect their property. In the same way that an individual 
will deter aggression by developing a reputation for fearsome commitment to 
vengeance, a collective has reason to carry out individual acts of retaliation that are 
costly and seemingly irrational. But internally, such collectives may suffer from 
conflicts of interest and mixed motives that give rise to standard collective action 
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of violent retaliation for having had one of their sheep stolen, but no particular 
shepherd may wish to be the one to carry out the dangerous act of violence. Each 
individual is tempted to free-ride on the behaviour of others, and the net result is 
likely to be a complete absence of retaliation. In such a setting, social norms within the 
collective, requiring defence of collective honor, may provide a crucial additional 
motivation that overcomes the temptation to free-riding. 
 
This conjecture entails an intriguing feature of norms of revenge—these norms have 
different strategic functions at different levels of analysis. Between honor-bearing 
collectives (i.e. between potential targets and perpetrators of aggression), the norms 
play the role of ensuring families carry out irrational retaliation, serving a deterrent 
role against other potential aggressions. Within collectives (among potential victims 
of future aggression whose fates are collectively tied to shared property), the norms 
play the role of ensuring the collective takes optimal action, overcoming individual 
temptations to defect. The second of these functions is similar to solving the 
prisoner’s dilemma: hence there turns out to be a powerful analogy to the central 
paradigm for studying moral norms. But at the same time, between families, these 
norms serve a function that is not stereotypically moral, and can be related to a game 
of conflict (e.g., Hawk–Dove). 
 
This may explain why honor norms appear to have similar motivational force as 
“moral” norms: they are, at one level of analysis, solving similar problems of free-
riding as moral norms are believed to solve. So it is unsurprising that they are similar 
in their psychological profile. It also suggests a reason why honor norms might often 
appear less universal than stereotypical moral norms: their function is to promote the 
competitive performance of one collective against another, so the norms have no 
proper function outside the relevant collective. 
 
What about the second paradigmatic honor norm: norms of purification? We believe 
this is best related to another sort of competitive paradigm: a competitive matching 
market for trading or exchange opportunities. In some cultures, marriage provides 
families with opportunities to improve economic prospects for the entire family. In 
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many such cultures, for reasons that are not entirely clear, there is a very high 
premium placed on female sexual chastity as a prerequisite for marriage (Mackie 
1996; Edlund 2018). This leads parents to restrict movement and education of female 
children from an early age, to arrange very early marriages to reduce opportunities for 
pre-marital sex, and other measures to control the sexual behaviour of adolescent 
females (Rai and Sengupta 2013). In some cultures of this sort, rumour of 
transgression by a female daughter can lead to forced marriage, to beating, and even 
to murder. Filicide of this sort is a particularly extreme incarnation of a purification 
norm. It is frequently referred to as “honor-killing” and it is typically undertaken in a 
way to ensure that the relevant community knows the murder has occurred. The 
family will often go out of its way to publicize rather than hide the killing. It is also 
usually done with implicit or explicit approval of the broader community, who regard 
the family’s honor as being to some degree restored as a result.  
 
Purification norms are even less well understood than revenge norms, but some work 
has been done to show that they may be intelligible in a strategic setting involving 
problems of trust and cooperation, broadly similar to a repeated prisoner’s dilemma 
(Thrasher and Handfield 2018). A family (typically an extended family) whose child is 
suspected of transgression needs to convince other families that its remaining children 
are of good standing. If this can be demonstrated, then it stands to make favourable 
marriages for those remaining children, and this will be of mutual benefit. But in a 
setting where other families are competing for the same marriage opportunities, it is 
not easy to demonstrate the chastity of one’s children, and even harder to convince 
that they will remain so in future. Honor killing may function as a costly signal of a 
family’s confidence in the chastity of its remaining children: families that expect their 
other children will behave dishonorably have less to gain by sending a costly signal 
which will later be undermined, relative to a family confident that its future children 
will behave impeccably. 
 
On this account, we can again distinguish two levels of function for such norms. 
Between groups, the norms serve as costly signals in a competitive marriage market. 
Because the signals are credible, they provide useful information, and depending on 
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broader conditions, may even be welfare enhancing for families. This in no way 
justifies the practice but at least makes it potentially intelligible, from a biological 
perspective, how such a wasteful practice with respect to human life can persist. 
 
Within groups, just like norms of revenge, norms of purification serve to overcome 
potential free-rider problems. While the extended family may be economically or 
biologically better off if an honor-killing is performed, this does not mean the task is 
easy to perform for any individual. In particular, honor-killers will often run the risk 
of judicial punishment. Thus, the norms of honor may be necessary to overcome the 




4 Does Honor Form a Unified Cluster? 
Having argued that honor is part of the moral domain, because norms of honor serve 
a cooperative purpose, we now consider some more specific features of honor norms 
which might explain why it has been so tempting to regard them as a distinctive 
category. For reasons touched on already, it is unlikely anything like a satisfactory set 
of necessary and sufficient conditions could be offered to demarcate honor from the 
rest of morality, but it is certainly conceivable that honor norms could form a 
relatively stable cluster, maintained by processes that promote coinstantiation of 
certain phenotypic traits (Boyd 1991; Millikan 2017). Such clusters may not be 
especially natural (Barrett 2007; O’Connor 2018), but nonetheless apt for successful 
induction.14 It is no doubt reasonable, having encountered a stable, unified cluster of 
phenotypic traits, over which one can make successful inductive inferences, to regard 
                                                      
14 Another alternative is that honor norms form a cluster whose unity is explained by common ancestry 
(Millikan 1999). But we find this implausible in the present case, given evidence that honor cultures 
arise spontaneously in the right environmental circumstances. One example is the US prison system, 
especially in states like California and Texas, where dramatic growth of the prison population has put 
traditional norms of prison behaviour under stress, and led to the emergence of gang organisations that 
are particularly florid examples of honor culture (Skarbek 2014). 
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that cluster as itself a kind. We suspect this explains the continuing attraction of the 
view that honor and morality are distinct. 
 
The unity of honor norms might be explained by their addressing a distinctive set of 
problems. Hence if honor norms were uniquely associated with some, but not all, of 
the MAC domains, this might be a basis for differentiation. But although honor does 
appear strongly associated with “heroism”, deference, and loyalty to family, it seems 
(i) unlikely that honor norms occupy only these domains, especially when we note 
norms related to generosity and honesty; and conversely (ii), it is unlikely that 
stereotypical norms of honor are the only candidates to occupy these particular 
domains. This suggests honor is just one possible set of solutions – likely incomplete 
– to the social challenges arising in these domains.  
 
Honor norms appear to be prominent in settings where, because exogenous and 
formal governance mechanisms are weak or non-existent, individuals rely on informal 
collectives such as the family, clan, gang, or tribe, in order to obtain protection 
(Weiner 2013; Skarbek 2014; Nisbett and Cohen 1996). Unsurprisingly, then, many 
norms of honor require profound sacrifices of individual wellbeing for the sake of the 
group – though we are aware of no way to systematically quantify the degree of 
sacrifice in honor cultures compared to other cultures. Indeed, in many honor 
cultures, individual identity appears to be much more closely integrated with group 
identity than in liberal, individualistic cultures (Sommers 2018). If these observations 
are correct, they might suffice to explain the relative unity of honor norms. 
 
We also find important commonalities when we look in more detail at the strategic 
settings to which the norms appear to be adapted. Honor cultures are functional in 
settings are more competitive, and less cooperative (A. Nowak et al. 2016). Although 
honor norms can make competitive situations relatively less conflictual, their home is 
in a setting of contest. This is obvious in our preferred model of norms of revenge: the 
Hawk–Dove game. In the marriage markets underlying violent purification norms, 
the conflict is less obvious, because markets are always in some sense cooperative. But 
in this case, we suggest, the limit on marriage opportunities and scarcity of elite male 
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spouses entails significant amounts of competition for marriage to those elites 
(Edlund 2018). Thus, both purification and revenge norms appear to be characteristic 
of settings involving significant levels of competition.15  
 
Finally, another mechanism which could give rise to clustering is if honor norms use a 
distinctive means of solving the social problems that they address. One promising 
hypothesis of this sort is that signalling is intrinsic to the functioning of honor norms. 
We have touched on signalling ideas in our discussion of purification norms above, 
but similar issues arise in the case of revenge norms. Revenge norms motivated 
behaviours which would reveal to potential aggressors that future aggressions would 
be met with dangerous retaliation. Given every family—even those who are not 
capable of retaliation—would like to make potential aggressors believe this message, 
any such attempt to communicate this idea is liable to be ignored. 
 
Costly signalling theory can explain how it can be strategically stable to send signals 
that credibly indicate a disposition to retaliate (Thrasher and Handfield 2018). If the 
marginal cost of sending the signal is higher for non-vengeful families than vengeful 
ones, then it may be possible to find a signal that is sufficiently costly to “price out of 
the market” the non-vengeful families—they cannot afford to send a signal of equal 
strength as the vengeful families, so they will send no signal at all. Given that in many 
honor cultures, the relevant signal is itself a lesser act of revenge—such as provoking a 
fight over a minor insult—it is indeed plausible that families who are well-organized, 
committed to defending their honor, and disposed to vengeance will find it easier (less 
costly) to retaliate in lesser conflicts than less dangerous families. At its extreme, there 
may be acts of violence that less dangerous families simply cannot organize—
performing acts such as this is a powerful demonstration (akin to a feat of strength or 
an ordeal) that is entirely credible. 
 
                                                      
15 It is perhaps no surprise then that honor norms and honor language are still commonly used in 
explicitly martial contexts.  
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Signalling appears to be central, then, to how norms of honor perform one of their key 
functions. Communities which embrace honor norms respond differentially to 
different types of agent (which may be groups or individuals), contingent on their 
honor status. The costly behaviours associated with defence of honor are the signals 
that make honorable status worth having, and make cooperative equilibria possible. 
Norms of morality, in contrast, do not appear to place such a central emphasis on 
signalling. While some accounts suggest particular altruistic or punitive behaviours 
have adaptive benefit because of their signalling value, (Henrich 2009; Jordan et al. 
2016), the signalling role does not appear essential to the function of the norms but 
rather may be part of an ancillary apparatus which stabilizes the norms.  
 
5 Conclusion 
Norms of honour, like norms of morality, appear to play “pro-social” roles, 
promoting trust in institutions of property and marriage that are important for 
maintaining cooperation between families and clans.16 To that extent, honor and 
morality appear similar: they are social technologies that facilitate cooperative 
solutions to social dilemmas. Indeed, we go further and say honour is best regarded as 
a subtype of morality understood generally as system of normative social technology.  
 
If the above account is correct, it has potential implications for meta-ethical debate. In 
particular, this framework makes clearer what commitments will be acquired by 
anyone hoping to prosecute an argument for (Kumar and Campbell 2015) or against 
(Doris and Plakias 2008) moral realism on the basis of the apparent “conflict” between 
cultures of honour and cultures of morality. It certainly does not settle the 
realism/anti-realism debate, which turns on subtle issues about the semantics of moral 
language, but it does suggest that if a plausible naturalistic realism is acceptable (of the 
                                                      
16 Although we argue honour norms are functionally “pro-social”, the norms themselves may require or 
allow what is typically considered “anti-social” and violent behaviour. But, as we have already argued, a 
considerable amount of violence is done is “moralistic” in one way or another (Black 1983; Fiske and 
Rai 2014). 
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sort found in Sterelny and Fraser (2016)), it is likely to be a pluralistic or relativistic 
realism that embraces tragic conflict among moral requirements.17  
 
In part, this follows from the theoretical presuppositions of the MAC framework. 
Even though MAC assumes moral technology is adaptive as a package, this is still 
consistent with there being significant conflict between norms adapted to different 
domains of cooperation. The domains identified by MAC are both sufficiently diverse 
and sufficiently ubiquitous that we may well find ourselves simultaneously subject to 
conflicting requirements. Morality may therefore be inherently tragic in this sense. 
 
Our central claims about the relationship between honour and morality are evidently 
empirical, and hence defeasible in light of future science. Whether the individual 
claims survive is less important than the broader project, which is to demonstrate that 
there are rich resources available within an evolutionary framework to improve 
understanding of the relationship between different types of norm. This approach is 
in tension with the normative project which tends to regard “moral” norms as 
importantly distinct from all other norms, and emphasises properties such as 
universality, categoricity, and objectivity. While we have done nothing to undermine 
that normative project, we advocate that the descriptive project engaged in here has a 
much stronger prospect of contributing to the explanation of actual human practices, 
with the goal being a truly scientific understanding of morality. This is a goal towards 
which, we suggest, philosophers should be willing to contribute. 
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17 On this point, see also (Harman 2015). 
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